random(4) - man - phpMan

 


random(4)
NAME SYNOPSIS DESCRIPTION FILES NOTES BUGS SEE ALSO COLOPHON
RANDOM(4)                             Linux Programmer's Manual                            RANDOM(4)



NAME
       random, urandom - kernel random number source devices

SYNOPSIS
       #include <linux/random.h>

       int ioctl(fd, RNDrequest, param);

DESCRIPTION
       The character special files /dev/random and /dev/urandom (present since Linux 1.3.30) provide
       an interface to the kernel's random number generator.  The file /dev/random has major  device
       number  1 and minor device number 8.  The file /dev/urandom has major device number 1 and mi‐
       nor device number 9.

       The random number generator gathers environmental noise from device drivers and other sources
       into an entropy pool.  The generator also keeps an estimate of the number of bits of noise in
       the entropy pool.  From this entropy pool, random numbers are created.

       Linux 3.17 and later provides the simpler and safer getrandom(2) interface which requires  no
       special files; see the getrandom(2) manual page for details.

       When read, the /dev/urandom device returns random bytes using a pseudorandom number generator
       seeded from the entropy pool.  Reads from this device do not block  (i.e.,  the  CPU  is  not
       yielded), but can incur an appreciable delay when requesting large amounts of data.

       When  read during early boot time, /dev/urandom may return data prior to the entropy pool be‐
       ing initialized.  If this is of concern in your application, use getrandom(2) or  /dev/random
       instead.

       The  /dev/random  device  is  a legacy interface which dates back to a time where the crypto‐
       graphic primitives used in the implementation of /dev/urandom were not  widely  trusted.   It
       will  return  random bytes only within the estimated number of bits of fresh noise in the en‐
       tropy pool, blocking if necessary.  /dev/random is suitable for applications that  need  high
       quality randomness, and can afford indeterminate delays.

       When  the  entropy pool is empty, reads from /dev/random will block until additional environ‐
       mental noise is gathered.  If open(2) is called for /dev/random with the O_NONBLOCK  flag,  a
       subsequent  read(2)  will  not  block if the requested number of bytes is not available.  In‐
       stead, the available bytes are returned.  If no byte is available, read(2) will return -1 and
       errno will be set to EAGAIN.

       The  O_NONBLOCK  flag  has no effect when opening /dev/urandom.  When calling read(2) for the
       device /dev/urandom, reads of up to 256 bytes will return as many bytes as are requested  and
       will  not be interrupted by a signal handler.  Reads with a buffer over this limit may return
       less than the requested number of bytes or fail with the error EINTR,  if  interrupted  by  a
       signal handler.

       Since  Linux  3.16,  a  read(2)  from /dev/urandom will return at most 32 MB.  A read(2) from
       /dev/random will return at most 512 bytes (340 bytes on Linux kernels before version 2.6.12).

       Writing to /dev/random or /dev/urandom will update the entropy pool with  the  data  written,
       but  this will not result in a higher entropy count.  This means that it will impact the con‐
       tents read from both files, but it will not make reads from /dev/random faster.

   Usage
       The /dev/random interface is considered a legacy interface, and /dev/urandom is preferred and
       sufficient in all use cases, with the exception of applications which require randomness dur‐
       ing early boot time; for these applications, getrandom(2) must be used  instead,  because  it
       will block until the entropy pool is initialized.

       If  a seed file is saved across reboots as recommended below, the output is cryptographically
       secure against attackers without local root access as soon as it is reloaded in the boot  se‐
       quence, and perfectly adequate for network encryption session keys.  (All major Linux distri‐
       butions have saved the seed file across reboots since  2000  at  least.)   Since  reads  from
       /dev/random  may  block, users will usually want to open it in nonblocking mode (or perform a
       read with timeout), and provide some sort of user notification if the desired entropy is  not
       immediately available.

   Configuration
       If  your  system does not have /dev/random and /dev/urandom created already, they can be cre‐
       ated with the following commands:

           mknod -m 666 /dev/random c 1 8
           mknod -m 666 /dev/urandom c 1 9
           chown root:root /dev/random /dev/urandom

       When a Linux system starts up without much operator interaction, the entropy pool may be in a
       fairly  predictable state.  This reduces the actual amount of noise in the entropy pool below
       the estimate.  In order to counteract this effect, it helps to carry entropy pool information
       across shut-downs and start-ups.  To do this, add the lines to an appropriate script which is
       run during the Linux system start-up sequence:

           echo "Initializing random number generator..."
           random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
           # Carry a random seed from start-up to start-up
           # Load and then save the whole entropy pool
           if [ -f $random_seed ]; then
               cat $random_seed >/dev/urandom
           else
               touch $random_seed
           fi
           chmod 600 $random_seed
           poolfile=/proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize
           [ -r $poolfile ] && bits=$(cat $poolfile) || bits=4096
           bytes=$(expr $bits / 8)
           dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=$bytes

       Also, add the following lines in an appropriate script which is run during the  Linux  system
       shutdown:

           # Carry a random seed from shut-down to start-up
           # Save the whole entropy pool
           echo "Saving random seed..."
           random_seed=/var/run/random-seed
           touch $random_seed
           chmod 600 $random_seed
           poolfile=/proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize
           [ -r $poolfile ] && bits=$(cat $poolfile) || bits=4096
           bytes=$(expr $bits / 8)
           dd if=/dev/urandom of=$random_seed count=1 bs=$bytes

       In the above examples, we assume Linux 2.6.0 or later, where /proc/sys/kernel/random/poolsize
       returns the size of the entropy pool in bits (see below).

   /proc interfaces
       The files in the directory /proc/sys/kernel/random (present since 2.3.16) provide  additional
       information about the /dev/random device:

       entropy_avail
              This  read-only  file  gives the available entropy, in bits.  This will be a number in
              the range 0 to 4096.

       poolsize
              This file gives the size of the entropy pool.  The semantics of this file vary  across
              kernel versions:

              Linux 2.4:
                     This  file  gives  the  size of the entropy pool in bytes.  Normally, this file
                     will have the value 512, but it is writable, and can be changed  to  any  value
                     for  which  an  algorithm is available.  The choices are 32, 64, 128, 256, 512,
                     1024, or 2048.

              Linux 2.6 and later:
                     This file is read-only, and gives the size of the entropy  pool  in  bits.   It
                     contains the value 4096.

       read_wakeup_threshold
              This file contains the number of bits of entropy required for waking up processes that
              sleep waiting for entropy from /dev/random.  The default is 64.

       write_wakeup_threshold
              This file contains the number of bits of entropy below which we wake up processes that
              do  a  select(2)  or  poll(2)  for  write  access to /dev/random.  These values can be
              changed by writing to the files.

       uuid and boot_id
              These       read-only       files       contain       random       strings        like
              6fd5a44b-35f4-4ad4-a9b9-6b9be13e1fe9.   The  former is generated afresh for each read,
              the latter was generated once.

   ioctl(2) interface
       The following ioctl(2) requests are defined on file descriptors connected to either /dev/random  or  /dev/urandom.   All requests performed will interact with the input entropy pool im‐
       pacting both /dev/random and /dev/urandom.  The CAP_SYS_ADMIN capability is required for  all
       requests except RNDGETENTCNT.

       RNDGETENTCNT
              Retrieve the entropy count of the input pool, the contents will be the same as the entropy_avail file under proc.  The result will be stored in the int pointed to  by  the
              argument.

       RNDADDTOENTCNT
              Increment  or decrement the entropy count of the input pool by the value pointed to by
              the argument.

       RNDGETPOOL
              Removed in Linux 2.6.9.

       RNDADDENTROPY
              Add some additional entropy to the input pool, incrementing the entropy  count.   This
              differs  from  writing  to  /dev/random or /dev/urandom, which only adds some data but
              does not increment the entropy count.  The following structure is used:

                  struct rand_pool_info {
                      int    entropy_count;
                      int    buf_size;
                      __u32  buf[0];
                  };

              Here entropy_count is the value added to (or subtracted from) the entropy  count,  and
              buf is the buffer of size buf_size which gets added to the entropy pool.

       RNDZAPENTCNT, RNDCLEARPOOL
              Zero  the  entropy count of all pools and add some system data (such as wall clock) to
              the pools.

FILES
       /dev/random
       /dev/urandom

NOTES
       For an overview and comparison of the various interfaces that can be used to  obtain  random‐
       ness, see random(7).

BUGS
       During early boot time, reads from /dev/urandom may return data prior to the entropy pool be‐
       ing initialized.

SEE ALSO
       mknod(1), getrandom(2), random(7)

       RFC 1750, "Randomness Recommendations for Security"

COLOPHON
       This page is part of release 5.10 of the Linux  man-pages  project.   A  description  of  the
       project,  information about reporting bugs, and the latest version of this page, can be found
       at https://www.kernel.org/doc/man-pages/.



Linux                                        2017-09-15                                    RANDOM(4)

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