{
    "mode": "info",
    "parameter": "SYSTEMD-CRYPTENROLL",
    "section": "",
    "url": "https://www.chedong.com/phpMan.php/info/SYSTEMD-CRYPTENROLL/json",
    "generated": "2026-07-05T13:25:07Z",
    "synopsis": "systemd-cryptenroll [OPTIONS...] [DEVICE]",
    "sections": {
        "NAME": {
            "content": "systemd-cryptenroll - Enroll PKCS#11, FIDO2, TPM2 token/devices to\nLUKS2 encrypted volumes\n",
            "subsections": []
        },
        "SYNOPSIS": {
            "content": "systemd-cryptenroll [OPTIONS...] [DEVICE]\n",
            "subsections": []
        },
        "DESCRIPTION": {
            "content": "systemd-cryptenroll is a tool for enrolling hardware security tokens\nand devices into a LUKS2 encrypted volume, which may then be used to\nunlock the volume during boot. Specifically, it supports tokens and\ncredentials of the following kind to be enrolled:\n\n1. PKCS#11 security tokens and smartcards that may carry an RSA key\npair (e.g. various YubiKeys)\n\n2. FIDO2 security tokens that implement the \"hmac-secret\" extension\n(most FIDO2 keys, including YubiKeys)\n\n3. TPM2 security devices\n\n4. Recovery keys. These are similar to regular passphrases, however\nare randomly generated on the computer and thus generally have\nhigher entropy than user chosen passphrases. Their character set\nhas been designed to ensure they are easy to type in, while having\nhigh entropy. They may also be scanned off screen using QR codes.\nRecovery keys may be used for unlocking LUKS2 volumes wherever\npassphrases are accepted. They are intended to be used in\ncombination with an enrolled hardware security token, as a recovery\noption when the token is lost.\n\n5. Regular passphrases\n\nIn addition, the tool may be used to enumerate currently enrolled\nsecurity tokens and wipe a subset of them. The latter may be combined\nwith the enrollment operation of a new security token, in order to\nupdate or replace enrollments.\n\nThe tool supports only LUKS2 volumes, as it stores token\nmeta-information in the LUKS2 JSON token area, which is not available\nin other encryption formats.\n",
            "subsections": []
        },
        "LIMITATIONS": {
            "content": "Note that currently when enrolling a new key of one of the five\nsupported types listed above, it is required to first provide a\npassphrase or recovery key (i.e. one of the latter two key types). For\nexample, it's currently not possible to unlock a device with a FIDO2\nkey in order to enroll a new FIDO2 key. Instead, in order to enroll a\nnew FIDO2 key, it is necessary to provide an already enrolled regular\npassphrase or recovery key. Thus, if in future key roll-over is desired\nit's generally recommended to combine TPM2, FIDO2, PKCS#11 key\nenrollment with enrolling a regular passphrase or recovery key.\n\nAlso note that support for enrolling multiple FIDO2 tokens is currently\nnot too useful, as while unlocking systemd-cryptsetup cannot identify\nwhich token is currently plugged in and thus does not know which\nauthentication request to send to the device. This limitation does not\napply to tokens enrolled via PKCS#11 -- because tokens of this type may\nbe identified immediately, before authentication.\n",
            "subsections": []
        },
        "OPTIONS": {
            "content": "The following options are understood:\n",
            "subsections": [
                {
                    "name": "--password",
                    "content": "Enroll a regular password/passphrase. This command is mostly\nequivalent to cryptsetup luksAddKey, however may be combined with\n--wipe-slot= in one call, see below.\n",
                    "long": "--password"
                },
                {
                    "name": "--recovery-key",
                    "content": "Enroll a recovery key. Recovery keys are most identical to\npassphrases, but are computer generated instead of human chosen,\nand thus have a guaranteed high entropy. The key uses a character\nset that is easy to type in, and may be scanned off screen via a QR\ncode.\n\n--pkcs11-token-uri=URI\nEnroll a PKCS#11 security token or smartcard (e.g. a YubiKey).\nExpects a PKCS#11 smartcard URI referring to the token.\nAlternatively the special value \"auto\" may be specified, in order\nto automatically determine the URI of a currently plugged in\nsecurity token (of which there must be exactly one). The special\nvalue \"list\" may be used to enumerate all suitable PKCS#11 tokens\ncurrently plugged in. The security token must contain an RSA key\npair which is used to encrypt the randomly generated key that is\nused to unlock the LUKS2 volume. The encrypted key is then stored\nin the LUKS2 JSON token header area.\n\nIn order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled PKCS#11 security\ntoken, specify the pkcs11-uri= option in the respective\n/etc/crypttab line:\n\nmyvolume /dev/sda1 - pkcs11-uri=auto\n\nSee crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a\nsystemd-cryptenroll invocation and its matching /etc/crypttab line.\n\n--fido2-device=PATH\nEnroll a FIDO2 security token that implements the \"hmac-secret\"\nextension (e.g. a YubiKey). Expects a hidraw device referring to\nthe FIDO2 device (e.g.  /dev/hidraw1). Alternatively the special\nvalue \"auto\" may be specified, in order to automatically determine\nthe device node of a currently plugged in security token (of which\nthere must be exactly one). The special value \"list\" may be used to\nenumerate all suitable FIDO2 tokens currently plugged in. Note that\nmany hardware security tokens that implement FIDO2 also implement\nthe older PKCS#11 standard. Typically FIDO2 is preferable, given\nit's simpler to use and more modern.\n\nIn order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled FIDO2 security\ntoken, specify the fido2-device= option in the respective\n/etc/crypttab line:\n\nmyvolume /dev/sda1 - fido2-device=auto\n\nSee crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a\nsystemd-cryptenroll invocation and its matching /etc/crypttab line.\n\n--fido2-with-client-pin=BOOL\nWhen enrolling a FIDO2 security token, controls whether to require\nthe user to enter a PIN when unlocking the volume (the FIDO2\n\"clientPin\" feature). Defaults to \"yes\". (Note: this setting is\nwithout effect if the security token does not support the\n\"clientPin\" feature at all, or does not allow enabling or disabling\nit.)\n\n--fido2-with-user-presence=BOOL\nWhen enrolling a FIDO2 security token, controls whether to require\nthe user to verify presence (tap the token, the FIDO2 \"up\" feature)\nwhen unlocking the volume. Defaults to \"yes\". (Note: this setting\nis without effect if the security token does not support the \"up\"\nfeature at all, or does not allow enabling or disabling it.)\n\n--fido2-with-user-verification=BOOL\nWhen enrolling a FIDO2 security token, controls whether to require\nuser verification when unlocking the volume (the FIDO2 \"uv\"\nfeature). Defaults to \"no\". (Note: this setting is without effect\nif the security token does not support the \"uv\" feature at all, or\ndoes not allow enabling or disabling it.)\n\n--tpm2-device=PATH\nEnroll a TPM2 security chip. Expects a device node path referring\nto the TPM2 chip (e.g.  /dev/tpmrm0). Alternatively the special\nvalue \"auto\" may be specified, in order to automatically determine\nthe device node of a currently discovered TPM2 device (of which\nthere must be exactly one). The special value \"list\" may be used to\nenumerate all suitable TPM2 devices currently discovered.\n\nIn order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled TPM2 security\nchip, specify the tpm2-device= option in the respective\n/etc/crypttab line:\n\nmyvolume /dev/sda1 - tpm2-device=auto\n\nSee crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a\nsystemd-cryptenroll invocation and its matching /etc/crypttab line.\n\nUse --tpm2-pcrs= (see below) to configure which TPM2 PCR indexes to\nbind the enrollment to.\n\n--tpm2-pcrs= [PCR...]\nConfigures the TPM2 PCRs (Platform Configuration Registers) to bind\nthe enrollment requested via --tpm2-device= to. Takes a \"+\"\nseparated list of numeric PCR indexes in the range 0...23. If not\nused, defaults to PCR 7 only. If an empty string is specified,\nbinds the enrollment to no PCRs at all. PCRs allow binding the\nenrollment to specific software versions and system state, so that\nthe enrolled unlocking key is only accessible (may be \"unsealed\")\nif specific trusted software and/or configuration is used.\n\nTable 1. Well-known PCR Definitions\n+----+----------------------------+\n|PCR | Explanation                |\n+----+----------------------------+\n|0   | Core system firmware       |\n|    | executable code; changes   |\n|    | on firmware updates        |\n+----+----------------------------+\n|1   | Core system firmware       |\n|    | data/host platform         |\n|    | configuration; typically   |\n|    | contains serial and model  |\n|    | numbers, changes on basic  |\n|    | hardware/CPU/RAM           |\n|    | replacements               |\n+----+----------------------------+\n|2   | Extended or pluggable      |\n|    | executable code; includes  |\n|    | option ROMs on pluggable   |\n|    | hardware                   |\n+----+----------------------------+\n|3   | Extended or pluggable      |\n|    | firmware data; includes    |\n|    | information about          |\n|    | pluggable hardware         |\n+----+----------------------------+\n|4   | Boot loader; changes on    |\n|    | boot loader updates        |\n+----+----------------------------+\n|5   | GPT/Partition table;       |\n|    | changes when the           |\n|    | partitions are added,      |\n|    | modified or removed        |\n+----+----------------------------+\n|6   | Power state events;        |\n|    | changes on system          |\n|    | suspend/sleep              |\n+----+----------------------------+\n|7   | Secure boot state; changes |\n|    | when UEFI SecureBoot mode  |\n|    | is enabled/disabled        |\n+----+----------------------------+\n|8   | sd-boot(7) measures the    |\n|    | kernel command line in     |\n|    | this PCR.                  |\n+----+----------------------------+\n\n--wipe-slot= [SLOT...]\nWipes one or more LUKS2 key slots. Takes a comma separated list of\nnumeric slot indexes, or the special strings \"all\" (for wiping all\nkey slots), \"empty\" (for wiping all key slots that are unlocked by\nan empty passphrase), \"password\" (for wiping all key slots that are\nunlocked by a traditional passphrase), \"recovery\" (for wiping all\nkey slots that are unlocked by a recovery key), \"pkcs11\" (for\nwiping all key slots that are unlocked by a PKCS#11 token), \"fido2\"\n(for wiping all key slots that are unlocked by a FIDO2 token),\n\"tpm2\" (for wiping all key slots that are unlocked by a TPM2 chip),\nor any combination of these strings or numeric indexes, in which\ncase all slots matching either are wiped. As safety precaution an\noperation that wipes all slots without exception (so that the\nvolume cannot be unlocked at all anymore, unless the volume key is\nknown) is refused.\n\nThis switch may be used alone, in which case only the requested\nwipe operation is executed. It may also be used in combination with\nany of the enrollment options listed above, in which case the\nenrollment is completed first, and only when successful the wipe\noperation executed -- and the newly added slot is always excluded\nfrom the wiping. Combining enrollment and slot wiping may thus be\nused to update existing enrollments:\n\nsystemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=tpm2 --tpm2-device=auto\n\nThe above command will enroll the TPM2 chip, and then wipe all\npreviously created TPM2 enrollments on the LUKS2 volume, leaving\nonly the newly created one. Combining wiping and enrollment may\nalso be used to replace enrollments of different types, for example\nfor changing from a PKCS#11 enrollment to a FIDO2 one:\n\nsystemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=pkcs11 --fido2-device=auto\n\nOr for replacing an enrolled empty password by TPM2:\n\nsystemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=empty --tpm2-device=auto\n",
                    "long": "--recovery-key"
                },
                {
                    "name": "-h, --help",
                    "content": "Print a short help text and exit.\n",
                    "flag": "-h",
                    "long": "--help"
                },
                {
                    "name": "--version",
                    "content": "Print a short version string and exit.\n",
                    "long": "--version"
                }
            ]
        },
        "EXIT STATUS": {
            "content": "On success, 0 is returned, a non-zero failure code otherwise.\n",
            "subsections": []
        },
        "SEE ALSO": {
            "content": "systemd(1), systemd-cryptsetup@.service(8), crypttab(5), cryptsetup(8)\n\nsystemd 249                                             SYSTEMD-CRYPTENROLL(1)",
            "subsections": []
        }
    },
    "summary": "systemd-cryptenroll - Enroll PKCS#11, FIDO2, TPM2 token/devices to LUKS2 encrypted volumes",
    "flags": [
        {
            "flag": "",
            "long": "--password",
            "arg": null,
            "description": "Enroll a regular password/passphrase. This command is mostly equivalent to cryptsetup luksAddKey, however may be combined with --wipe-slot= in one call, see below."
        },
        {
            "flag": "",
            "long": "--recovery-key",
            "arg": null,
            "description": "Enroll a recovery key. Recovery keys are most identical to passphrases, but are computer generated instead of human chosen, and thus have a guaranteed high entropy. The key uses a character set that is easy to type in, and may be scanned off screen via a QR code. --pkcs11-token-uri=URI Enroll a PKCS#11 security token or smartcard (e.g. a YubiKey). Expects a PKCS#11 smartcard URI referring to the token. Alternatively the special value \"auto\" may be specified, in order to automatically determine the URI of a currently plugged in security token (of which there must be exactly one). The special value \"list\" may be used to enumerate all suitable PKCS#11 tokens currently plugged in. The security token must contain an RSA key pair which is used to encrypt the randomly generated key that is used to unlock the LUKS2 volume. The encrypted key is then stored in the LUKS2 JSON token header area. In order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled PKCS#11 security token, specify the pkcs11-uri= option in the respective /etc/crypttab line: myvolume /dev/sda1 - pkcs11-uri=auto See crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a systemd-cryptenroll invocation and its matching /etc/crypttab line. --fido2-device=PATH Enroll a FIDO2 security token that implements the \"hmac-secret\" extension (e.g. a YubiKey). Expects a hidraw device referring to the FIDO2 device (e.g. /dev/hidraw1). Alternatively the special value \"auto\" may be specified, in order to automatically determine the device node of a currently plugged in security token (of which there must be exactly one). The special value \"list\" may be used to enumerate all suitable FIDO2 tokens currently plugged in. Note that many hardware security tokens that implement FIDO2 also implement the older PKCS#11 standard. Typically FIDO2 is preferable, given it's simpler to use and more modern. In order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled FIDO2 security token, specify the fido2-device= option in the respective /etc/crypttab line: myvolume /dev/sda1 - fido2-device=auto See crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a systemd-cryptenroll invocation and its matching /etc/crypttab line. --fido2-with-client-pin=BOOL When enrolling a FIDO2 security token, controls whether to require the user to enter a PIN when unlocking the volume (the FIDO2 \"clientPin\" feature). Defaults to \"yes\". (Note: this setting is without effect if the security token does not support the \"clientPin\" feature at all, or does not allow enabling or disabling it.) --fido2-with-user-presence=BOOL When enrolling a FIDO2 security token, controls whether to require the user to verify presence (tap the token, the FIDO2 \"up\" feature) when unlocking the volume. Defaults to \"yes\". (Note: this setting is without effect if the security token does not support the \"up\" feature at all, or does not allow enabling or disabling it.) --fido2-with-user-verification=BOOL When enrolling a FIDO2 security token, controls whether to require user verification when unlocking the volume (the FIDO2 \"uv\" feature). Defaults to \"no\". (Note: this setting is without effect if the security token does not support the \"uv\" feature at all, or does not allow enabling or disabling it.) --tpm2-device=PATH Enroll a TPM2 security chip. Expects a device node path referring to the TPM2 chip (e.g. /dev/tpmrm0). Alternatively the special value \"auto\" may be specified, in order to automatically determine the device node of a currently discovered TPM2 device (of which there must be exactly one). The special value \"list\" may be used to enumerate all suitable TPM2 devices currently discovered. In order to unlock a LUKS2 volume with an enrolled TPM2 security chip, specify the tpm2-device= option in the respective /etc/crypttab line: myvolume /dev/sda1 - tpm2-device=auto See crypttab(5) for a more comprehensive example of a systemd-cryptenroll invocation and its matching /etc/crypttab line. Use --tpm2-pcrs= (see below) to configure which TPM2 PCR indexes to bind the enrollment to. --tpm2-pcrs= [PCR...] Configures the TPM2 PCRs (Platform Configuration Registers) to bind the enrollment requested via --tpm2-device= to. Takes a \"+\" separated list of numeric PCR indexes in the range 0...23. If not used, defaults to PCR 7 only. If an empty string is specified, binds the enrollment to no PCRs at all. PCRs allow binding the enrollment to specific software versions and system state, so that the enrolled unlocking key is only accessible (may be \"unsealed\") if specific trusted software and/or configuration is used. Table 1. Well-known PCR Definitions +----+----------------------------+ |PCR | Explanation | +----+----------------------------+ |0 | Core system firmware | | | executable code; changes | | | on firmware updates | +----+----------------------------+ |1 | Core system firmware | | | data/host platform | | | configuration; typically | | | contains serial and model | | | numbers, changes on basic | | | hardware/CPU/RAM | | | replacements | +----+----------------------------+ |2 | Extended or pluggable | | | executable code; includes | | | option ROMs on pluggable | | | hardware | +----+----------------------------+ |3 | Extended or pluggable | | | firmware data; includes | | | information about | | | pluggable hardware | +----+----------------------------+ |4 | Boot loader; changes on | | | boot loader updates | +----+----------------------------+ |5 | GPT/Partition table; | | | changes when the | | | partitions are added, | | | modified or removed | +----+----------------------------+ |6 | Power state events; | | | changes on system | | | suspend/sleep | +----+----------------------------+ |7 | Secure boot state; changes | | | when UEFI SecureBoot mode | | | is enabled/disabled | +----+----------------------------+ |8 | sd-boot(7) measures the | | | kernel command line in | | | this PCR. | +----+----------------------------+ --wipe-slot= [SLOT...] Wipes one or more LUKS2 key slots. Takes a comma separated list of numeric slot indexes, or the special strings \"all\" (for wiping all key slots), \"empty\" (for wiping all key slots that are unlocked by an empty passphrase), \"password\" (for wiping all key slots that are unlocked by a traditional passphrase), \"recovery\" (for wiping all key slots that are unlocked by a recovery key), \"pkcs11\" (for wiping all key slots that are unlocked by a PKCS#11 token), \"fido2\" (for wiping all key slots that are unlocked by a FIDO2 token), \"tpm2\" (for wiping all key slots that are unlocked by a TPM2 chip), or any combination of these strings or numeric indexes, in which case all slots matching either are wiped. As safety precaution an operation that wipes all slots without exception (so that the volume cannot be unlocked at all anymore, unless the volume key is known) is refused. This switch may be used alone, in which case only the requested wipe operation is executed. It may also be used in combination with any of the enrollment options listed above, in which case the enrollment is completed first, and only when successful the wipe operation executed -- and the newly added slot is always excluded from the wiping. Combining enrollment and slot wiping may thus be used to update existing enrollments: systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=tpm2 --tpm2-device=auto The above command will enroll the TPM2 chip, and then wipe all previously created TPM2 enrollments on the LUKS2 volume, leaving only the newly created one. Combining wiping and enrollment may also be used to replace enrollments of different types, for example for changing from a PKCS#11 enrollment to a FIDO2 one: systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=pkcs11 --fido2-device=auto Or for replacing an enrolled empty password by TPM2: systemd-cryptenroll /dev/sda1 --wipe-slot=empty --tpm2-device=auto"
        },
        {
            "flag": "-h",
            "long": "--help",
            "arg": null,
            "description": "Print a short help text and exit."
        },
        {
            "flag": "",
            "long": "--version",
            "arg": null,
            "description": "Print a short version string and exit."
        }
    ],
    "examples": [],
    "see_also": [
        {
            "name": "systemd",
            "section": "1",
            "url": "https://www.chedong.com/phpMan.php/man/systemd/1/json"
        },
        {
            "name": ".service",
            "section": "8",
            "url": "https://www.chedong.com/phpMan.php/man/.service/8/json"
        },
        {
            "name": "crypttab",
            "section": "5",
            "url": "https://www.chedong.com/phpMan.php/man/crypttab/5/json"
        },
        {
            "name": "cryptsetup",
            "section": "8",
            "url": "https://www.chedong.com/phpMan.php/man/cryptsetup/8/json"
        }
    ]
}